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Abstract
Background: Avian influenza threatens public health worldwide because it is usually associated with
severe illness and, consequently, a higher risk of death. During the first months of 2006, Turkey
experienced its first human avian influenza epidemic. A total of 21 human cases were identified, 12 of which
were confirmed by the National Institute for Medical Research. Nine of the cases, including the four fatal
ones, were from the Dogubeyazit-Van region. This study aims to evaluate the efforts at the avian influenza
outbreak control in the Van-Dogubeyazit region in 2006 through the experiences of health personnel.
Methods: We conducted in-depth interviews with seventeen key informants who took active roles during
the avian influenza outbreak in East Turkey during the first months of 2006. We gathered information
about the initial responses, the progress and management of the outbreak control, and the reactions of
the health professionals and the public. The findings of the study are reported according to the topics that
appeared through thematic analysis of the interview transcripts.
Results: Following the first suspected avian influenza cases, a Van Crisis Coordination Committee was
formed as the coordinating and decision-making body and played an important role in the appropriate
timing of decisions. The health and agriculture services could not be well coordinated owing to the lack of
integrated planning in preparation for outbreak and of integrated surveillance programs. Traditional
poultry practice together with the low socio-economic status of the people and the lack of health care
access in the region seemed to be a major risk for animal to animal and animal to human transmission. The
strengths and weaknesses of the present health system – primary health care services, national surveillance
and notification systems, human resource and management – affected the inter organizational coordination
during the outbreak. Open communication between the government and the public played an important
part in overcoming difficulties.
Conclusion: Although there were problems during the avian influenza outbreak in Turkey, the rapid
responses of the central and regional health authorities and the performance of the health workers were
the key points in controlling the epidemic. The lessons from this outbreak should provide an opportunity
for integrating the preparation plans of the health and agricultural organizations, and for revising the
surveillance system and enhancing the role of the primary health care services in controlling epidemic
disease. Developing successful strategies based on knowledge and experience may play a valuable role in
delaying an avian influenza pandemic.
Published: 15 November 2007
BMC Public Health 2007, 7:330 doi:10.1186/1471-2458-7-330
Received: 16 January 2007
Accepted: 15 November 2007
This article is available from: http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/330
© 2007 Sarikaya and Erbaydar; licensee BioMed Central Ltd. 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), 
which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.BMC Public Health 2007, 7:330 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/330
Page 2 of 11
(page number not for citation purposes)
Background
The highly pathogenic Avian Influenza A (H5N1) virus
has caused more than ten outbreaks worldwide and many
related human fatalities have occurred since 1997. A total
of 258 laboratory-confirmed cases have been reported in
South East Asia, North Africa and Europe by the World
Health Organization (WHO) and 154 people with con-
firmed avian influenza died between 2003 and 2006
[1,2]. Most patients have similar features; they are chil-
dren, they have a history of close contact with poultry or
wild birds, and they live in some of the poorest areas of
the world. The human cases in Turkey and Azerbaijan
were the first confirmed reports of human avian influenza
infection outside Asia and Africa. This was alarming not
only for Turkey but also for the European Union and
other countries. After considering the epidemiological
and laboratory evidence, WHO has maintained its pan-
demic alert at Phase 3 (of 6), indicating that the new influ-
enza strain causes human infections with no or very
limited human to human transmission [3].
Effective surveillance, early warning systems and contain-
ment measures based upon a general capacity for health
care have been recognized by WHO as the essential action
strategies [4,5]. In May 2002, "The Global Agenda for
Influenza", which was issued by WHO, stressed the neces-
sity of expanding animal influenza surveillance, and
noted that studies at the domestic-wild bird and human-
domestic bird interfaces are part of this activity [6].
The H5N1 type of avian influenza virus outbreak was
lived in Turkey on January 2006; a total of 21 human cases
were identified [3], 12 of which were confirmed by the
National Institute for Medical Research [3,7]. Nine of the
cases, including the 4 fatal ones, were from the Dog-
ubeyazit-Van region. The confirmed cases were people
aged 3–16 years who had close contact with ill poultry in
the rural area in Dogubeyazit or in migrant wards in Van
[3,7,8]. The timeline of events was summarized in Table 1.
In this period, more than one hundred suspected human
cases (21% of total suspected patient in YYU Hospital)
underwent prophylactic therapy in the outpatient clinic
and twenty five percent of patients who had a history of
contact and/or clinical findings were hospitalized in YYU
Hospital [7]. Tens of thousands of chickens were culled
[8].
Avian influenza infections in Turkey provide an example
of concurrent animal and human avian influenza epidem-
ics. These were the first occurrences of human cases in the
country, and the impact of the epidemic was quite strong.
It was the main agenda for the local and national institu-
tions of health, agriculture and other sectors, the commu-
nity and the media during the first months of 2006.
This study aims to understand the course of the avian
influenza outbreak control in Turkey through the views of
health care providers. It will also highlight what local
health personnel in various positions experienced during
that period.
Methods
This qualitative study was carried out in Dogubeyazit and
Van in May 2006. We interviewed seventeen key inform-
ants who took active roles during the outbreak of avian
influenza in East Turkey during the first months of 2006.
The twelve of interviewees were medical doctors (direc-
tors, specialists and general practitioners), three were
allied health personnel (one director and two health offic-
ers), and two were midwife and nurse (primary health
care provider and director). Most of the informants were
senior staff and had primary responsibilities for the man-
agement of the outbreak control.
Five informants were from the Van Provincial Health
Directorate (PHD). These informants were the Director
and the Deputy Director of the PHD, who were the main
coordinators of the avian influenza outbreak interven-
tion, two department chiefs who were involved in imple-
menting the intervention and one health officer who is
responsible for transportation of the samples and record
keeping.
Four informants were health personnel in primary health
care centers; three general practitioners and one midwife,
who have active roles in surveillance in Van and Dog-
ubeyazit. One of the general practitioners made the initial
diagnosis of the avian case at a primary health care center
in Van. Two general practitioners were staff of the primary
health care center in Dogubeyazit. One of the doctors
were the chief of the primary health care center and
worked as a coordinator of avian influenza outbreak inter-
vention and the other one was assigned to the avian influ-
enza surveillance.
Three informants were staff of the State Hospitals in Van
and Dogubeyazit. The first was an infectious disease spe-
cialist working in Van State Hospital. The second was the
Director of Dogubeyazit State Hospital during the out-
break. The third was a pediatrician working in Dog-
ubeyazit State Hospital who pre-diagnosed the avian cases
in Dogubeyazit. They worked as if gate-keepers between
the primary health care center and the YYU Hospital dur-
ing the outbreak.
Five informants were Van YYU hospital staff. They were
the Director of the University Hospital, the chief of nurs-
ing staff, two specialists and one health officer. The infec-
tious disease specialist is on duty in the infectious disease
control committee of YYU Hospital, who was a counselorBMC Public Health 2007, 7:330 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/330
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in the Van Crisis Coordination Committee (CCC) and
communicated with WHO representatives for the out-
break control. One internal medicine specialist who was
also a native of Dogubeyazit helped the Provincial Health
Directorates and WHO representatives to communicate
with families from Dogubeyazit. The health officer was
assigned to the emergency services during the outbreak
and he was also the representative of the Health Workers
Union in Van.
We used a semi structured guide consisting of open ended
questions during in-depth interviews. All interviews were
audio-taped and field notes were taken afterwards from
each interview for data-gathering. The appointments with
the informants were arranged by the second author of this
study, who worked in Van Yuzuncu Yil University, and the
interviews were conducted by the first author, who
worked outside the region. The authors clarified the pur-
poses of the study and the interviews were conducted with
the informants' consent for audio-taping and for the use
of their words in the report. In the institutions where the
authors were affiliated, interview studies are not subject to
permissions from ethical committees. Thus, the authors
did not apply for approval of these institutions.
Following the interview guide, we asked the participants
to inform us about the events chronologically: the first
responses of the organizations, the management of out-
break control, the reactions of the health personnel and
the resident population, the inter-organizational coordi-
nation, and interviewees' roles during the avian influenza
outbreak in Turkey. We also asked them to evaluate the
strength and weakness of the outbreak control, and the
lessons from the avian influenza outbreak.
Records were transcribed verbatim. The authors read and
identified codes for major themes according to their inter-
est for the study. These codes were then marked to lines of
text and the relevant codes were collected one under the
other for preliminary analysis. The second analysis
Table 1: Timeline of the avian influenza outbreak in Turkey 2006
Dates Events
8–26 October 2005 • Turkish Ministiry of Agriculture (MoA) announced the presence of H5N1 influenza in poultry in the north-western part 
of the country on 8 October a, b.
• On 13 October, World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) confirmed the presence of H5N1 in samples taken from 
patient poultry in Turkeya.
• Deaths of chickens occurred in Dogubeyazit near the end of 2005, and a confirmed outbreak of H5N1 avian influenza in 
chickens and ducks was reported on 26 Decemberb.
• The Turkish Ministiry of Health (MoH) published the country's first national pandemic influenza action plan, developed 
on the basis of the WHO checklist for influenza pandemic preparedness planninga.
24–25 December 2005 • Three children in one family in Dogubeyazit, in Agri province, applied to the local outpatient clinic and treated for fever, 
sore throat, arthralgia and myalgiaa.
30–31 December 2005 • The children's condition had worsened and was brought to Dogubeyazit State Hospital's by their fathera.
• The doctor of emergency room and consultant pediatrician in DSH accepted them as suspected avian influenza cases 
and transferred to the Van Yuzuncu Yil Univesity (YYU) Hospitala, b.
1–5 January 2006 • Samples taken from cases included in the ongoing influenza surveillance in the region were sent to the Turkish MoH, 
Ankara Hifzisihha Laboratoriesa. On 4 January the MoH received confirmation of H5N1 from National Influenza Centre 
at the Refik Saydam Hygiene Centre in Ankara and Capa Hospital in Istanbula.
• Turkish MoH notified the WHO Regional Office for Europe of the outbreak through the WHO Country Officea.
• The Turkish MoH put its avian influenza preparedness plan in actiona, b.
• A regional meeting was held at the Van PHD to which the Governors of eight cities, the responsible Deputy Director of 
the PHD, communicable disease unit directors, provincial agriculture and rural affairs directors and animal health unit 
directors were invited.
• Turkish and WHO experts assembled to review the epidemiological situation and provide further laboratory and clinical 
expertisea.
6–7 January 2006 • The National Institute for Medical Research which is the influenza reference laboratory and WHO collaborating center 
confirmed the presence of H5N1 in samples from the patients at YYU Hospitala.
• The surveillance started in the region and the health team was assigned with the avian influenza surveillance from 
Ankara to Van and Dogubeyazitb.
• The members of Turkish MoH Avian Influenza Scientific Committee interviewed with the experts of WHO, CDC and 
European Unionb.
8–12 January 2006 • Turkish MoH and MoA teams moved to Van and organized the meeting with the authorities from nine provincesb.
• Total 12 cases from Dogubeyazit (8), Van (1), Sanliurfa (1), Kastamonu (1) and Eskisehir (1) were confirmed by National 
Institute for Medical Researchb.
• Eight of confirmed cases were treated at Van YYU Hospital and the others treated at Diyarbakir Dicle University 
Hospital, Sanliurfa Children Hospital, and Agri State Hospital.
a WHO [3]
b Buzgan T [8]
c Oner AF et al [7]BMC Public Health 2007, 7:330 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/330
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involved recovering the relevant codes from the text. The
results of the study are reported according to the topics
revealed by the analysis.
Results
In the avian influenza outbreak, the studies by health
organizations were defined by two features as suggested
by the interviewees: it was perceived as a new and
unknown disease; and it was encountered as a regional,
national and international crisis by the health authorities.
The preparedness of animal and human health organiza-
tions for outbreak- human resource, management, sur-
veillance approach and notification systems- affected inter
organizational coordination during the outbreak.
Avian influenza infection as a new and unknown disease
Indeed, avian influenza infection was perceived as new
and unknown disease by health care providers a consulted
paediatrician from Dogubeyazit Government Hospital
explained as: " On December 31st, my colleague called and
said that there were 'some patients in here who've been coming
for three days now, and their conditions are very serious'. The
chest x-ray was very bad, decreased leukocyte and thrombocyte
counts in the laboratory analyses. I said it was possibly a viral
disease (...); 'an epidemic, if four people have caught it. There
is little that we can do here because of Dogubeyazit's limited
facilities. We have to refer them to the University Hospital.'
(...)".
The events that took place after the referral of suspected
cases from Dogubeyazit to YYU Hospital were explained
by the Institution's Director: "I learned that some children
had a viral infection that didn't match atypical pneumonia. I
connected paediatricians and they said yes, 'it may be bird flu,
SARS or something else (...) this is a significantly different dis-
ease that advances rapidly'. They said 'we're confused, there's
not much we can do, we have no opportunity for detailed anal-
ysis, but we are still investigating (...)". We informed the gov-
ernor, gendarme and security forces; they're checking entrances
and exits" Following this information, Van CCC decided
for animal quarantine, and entrances and exits of poultry
to the region were forbidden.
The general practitioner who pre-diagnosed the patient
defined the perceptions of health care providers towards
an unknown disease: "Frankly, I did not believe in bird flu
that much. I thought that this disease would never come to Tur-
key from its Far Eastern origins (...) that day my patients came,
two sisters, the younger one was 8 and the elder was 25. They
said something like, 'our chickens have started to die, and I
wondered if it was the bird flu that we've seen on the TV'. I
looked at the child and there was no clinical finding except con-
junctivitis. Now, on the one hand, there was something that I
don't believe, and on the other hand I had sisters talking about
dead chickens (...) At that point, I checked my conscience. I
said, all right then; let's consider these as bird flu cases. I gave
the notice to the Van PHD immediately".
The response of the avian influenza outbreak and 
associated problems
After laboratory confirmation of the suspected cases from
Dogubeyazit, trace-back investigations initiated by the
Local Health Authority were converted by the Turkish
MoH intended zoning directed to the source of infection.
Oriented by these instructions, doctors were assigned with
the surveillance in Dogubeyazit from various parts of Tur-
key. The process was explained by a general practitioner
who is responsible for the avian influenza surveillance
from the primary health care center (PHCC) in Dog-
ubeyazit: "In the beginning, we thought that it would be best
to visit the neighbourhoods and villages in which the cases were
encountered and then visit the rest of the area in the remaining
time. Just half of Dogubeyazit had been scanned in a period of
15 days. Later we were told that field studies would continue
until the end of April and that a new health team would be sent,
but nothing like that happened. Field studies were stopped
when the number of new cases lessened."
Health personnel supported to the field studies and well
communicated with community during the surveillance
in Dogubeyazit. However, the deployment of these stud-
ies and harsh weather caused some transportation prob-
lems. A general practitioner participating in the field
studies in PHCC explained the efforts for these problems
solving: " The doctors worked very hard. Because it was snow,
studies in villages could be made away slowly (...) We encoun-
tered serious basic logistic problems. Importantly, no extra
budget was given to the primary health care centers for the field
studies. The equipment was sent to the State Hospital by the
MoH. We had a lot of vehicle trouble. We managed to compen-
sate with vehicles or ambulances from the Dogubeyazit District
Education Directorate, Governorship and Municipality. Things
were better at the center."
WHO team, experienced in influenza outbreaks in differ-
ent countries came to the region during the outbreak.
WHO experts investigated the animal to human transmis-
sion in the region and helped the Turkish authorities to
develop the strategies for the outbreak control. A specialist
working in the Van CCC as a representative from Van YYU
expressed the importance of the situation through the
evaluations of WHO representatives: "There was well com-
munication between the Health Directorate, WHO and YYU
all the time. WHO teams thought that the surveillance system
was not installed and patient records were not being kept in
order. Indeed, a group of patients come to our hospital with cer-
tain complaints and we evaluate them. We hospitalize them if
necessary, and there is another considerable risk group to whom
we give prophylaxis. But we can't follow the group that receives
prophylaxis. Nobody cares if something happens to them later."BMC Public Health 2007, 7:330 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/330
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The comments related to follow up show us that there is
an inconsistency between the pandemic influenza action
plan and avian influenza surveillance approach. Although
a circular of Turkish MoH was announced on October
2005 including a flow chart to evaluate the suspected
cases, the exclusion of primary health care centers and
hospitals in the sentinel surveillance and the lack of
regional preparedness might have caused health care
workers to miss some cases in the referral and reporting
procedures.
The problems during the follow up studies were verified
by the Health Directorate Deputy Director: "The problem
was this: the disease identified but surveillance couldn't have
been initiated (...) At that time, the Turkish MoH didn't have
a health record system for surveillance by the primary health
care centers. So the practitioner needed to record cases on those
forms so they would be reported to the second stage health care
services."
After the confirmation of the first patient by Ankara Hifz-
isihha Laboratory, a patient data form for surveillance was
developed by the Van PHD communicable disease depart-
ment and sent to the PHCCs of the region to follow up the
suspected avian influenza cases. Later, however, the Turk-
ish MoH sent new surveillance forms, but these were
changed after WHO's proposals were adopted and the
final guideline was then developed. The contribution of
WHO team was helpful for the standardization of the
form but the differentiation between the surveillance
forms after from the avian influenza outbreak raised con-
fusion as the Director of the Communicable Diseases Unit
in the Van PHD stated: "(...) the primary health care workers
were also confused because the forms had been changed four
times. There had been a lack of coordination concerning the
surveillance forms. In my opinion, to maintain standardiza-
tion, the Turkish MoH should have sent the forms much ear-
lier".
After the confirmation of the suspected cases, Van Crisis
Coordination Committee assembled committed an
important role in managing the outbreak by well-timed
decision making and by ensuring the participation of dif-
ferent organizations.
Because the outbreak threatened human and animal
health, the coordination of studies by the Turkish MoA
and Turkish MoH organizations became a vital issue. The
lack of infrastructure and the experience of outbreak con-
trol emerged serious difficulties between health and agri-
culture organizations. Turkish MoA was not conducted
the animal surveillance in accordance with the laboratory
results of human cases. This issue was explained by the
Van PHD Director: "Normally, to start culling, the Van PAD
announces that a site is infected. After that, health care provid-
ers conduct an operation within the site. But, the reverse has
happened in here. First, we found our case and reported to the
Van PAD. We said, 'Here is an infected site, you have to start
the surveillance' and agriculture teams started culling the next
day".
The Van PAD tried to overcome the personnel insuffi-
ciency by purchasing services. In the meantime, both the
people and the agriculture providers have contamination
risk in the infected region. A deputy director from the Van
PHD who coordinated surveillance in Van stated that:
"We saw dead chickens in coops during the field study, doors
open, and no disinfection. Everywhere was covered with snow
and the coops had become a playground for children (...) MoA
teams decided to purchase services and veterinarians joined in.
Some cullers had no protective equipment. In most areas, hosts
held their chicken and it started to struggle, its saliva was scat-
tered around. There was high contamination risk".
Restricted surveillance proceeded in Dogubeyazit and
were carried out uncomplicated with the reinforcement by
the health care providers coming from outside the county.
However, there was a different problem here. A health
officer from YYU Hospital stated that the Turkish MoA
teams did not conduct a standard operation and that this
caused economic loss of the poultry owners:
"People live on chicken and eggs in this region. Now, suddenly,
all the chickens were sick and they were slaughtered in panic.
No distinction was made as to whether a bird was healthy or
sick. Economically, this shouldn't have been done to people liv-
ing here. This may completely confuse people in this region, who
hardly have anything left".
The cost of the culling animals was partially paid to the
owners to compensate their economic loss. But in practice
the official records couldn't be made exactly, therefore
most of poultry owners could not receive the compensa-
tions and they had been subject to high rates of financial
loss. The situation was expressed by the general practi-
tioner from the primary health care center in Dog-
ubeyazit:"Now about 90–100 thousand chickens were
slaughtered. Five Turkish liras were to be paid for each but only
30% of this price was paid because 70% of them were taken
without any official record so people couldn't claim their
rights."
First reactions of the health care providers and problems
After the declaration of avian influenza outbreak by the
Turkish MoH, people's reactions to the disaster and
patient applications increased to health care centers. The
fear and panic were experienced among health care pro-
viders. This situation was explained by a health officer
from YYU hospital: "When cases arrived in Van we faced
unbelievable panic and fear. There was no information relatedBMC Public Health 2007, 7:330 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/330
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to the situation. Sometimes other staff was affected by clinical
personnel wearing a mask while walking outside the hospital.
Suspected avian cases were brought in the emergency room side
by side with other patients. Now, health care providers were
agitated and excited, not knowing what to do".
Initially, the health personnel's behaviour affected the
people's psychological status. The statement by the infec-
tious disease specialist from Van State Hospital was as fol-
lows: "Health personnel were anxious, they panicked.
Everybody wanted Tamiflu. No, I gave it to no one, including
myself. They were convinced after the information gathering".
A health officer, who was getting the samples and trans-
porting it to laboratory, expressed his anxiety and desper-
ation due to the lack of protective equipment as follows:
There was no clear information (...). We couldn't protect our-
selves at the beginning. We were used to the non-protective
gloves and masks. Later, I wore two pairs of gloves. I know that
it does not spread from human to human, but there is a fear
that cannot be conquered".
The delay in the protective equipment support was the
main reasons for the worries of the health personnel
working in the wards: "Patient aspiration, mouth care, intra-
venous, drawing of blood. All of this was done by our team and
our health personnel grumbled because we didn't have protec-
tive glasses. After it was made known by the media, equipment
was supplied to us, but it wasn't sufficient (...) We could have
been informed earlier, in fact. This disease is contagious and
deadly (...) We only had simple surgical masks. Despite that,
we used gloves, coats and bonnets." After the chaos of first
day the Turkish MoH provided personal protective equip-
ment for the health care providers in the region.
In Dogubeyazit, the main problem was the distribution of
protective equipment, as well as providing it. A midwife
who took part in the field studies stated her worries about
contamination risk of her own family members and how
this affected their efficiency at work: "We went to the sur-
veillance for suspected cases, but masks and glasses reached us
after the work was finished (...) I was very sad when I heard
that we would go to a suspected case. What if I get infected, if
I transport it home? I have little kids. I think if they were given
to us before, more efficient work could have been achieved, I
guess."
The participation of the people during the avian influenza 
outbreak and trust in governmental authorities
The relatives of other patients were affected psychological
because their children were treated in the same clinic by
avian flu patients. They wanted to discharge from hospi-
tal. Their reactions, according to the chief of nursing staff,
were as follows: "Relatives of the patients were anxious. They
tried to take their children we had transferred to other rooms.
Everybody was anxious. The greatest anxiety concerned whether
human-to-human transmission was possible."
Relatives of avian influenza patients faced many difficul-
ties because of communications with the health care pro-
viders in the hospital. The words of the general
practitioner reflects us the human side of the disaster and
the psychological status of the affected people. "But what
a trauma, a disaster, darkness. I enter a room and get goose
pimples, a mother and her seven children. I take the patients'
history, but she doesn't know Turkish; she doesn't say anything
and then starts a Kurdish elegy, just like I've seen on TV. As if
she's in a trance. The mother with her 7–8 kids and they don't
know to whom the death will come. Just waiting like that, ter-
rible psychology."
Traditional family-based poultry farming in that region is
the largest food and income resource. According to the
director of the Van PHD at that time, people were initially
unwilling to hand over their animals although declara-
tions were alarming. After informative media operations,
they helped to the culling operations. Crisis centers
assembled at the Van PAD and PHD by the decision of the
Van CCC were kept operational 24/7. National and local
media organizations announced the phone numbers for
people having questions of any kind: "For instance, agricul-
ture personnel had serious problems during the field study from
time to time. Some of the people didn't want to hand over their
chickens. 'My animal is healthy, why are you taking it?' they
were generally saying (...) In this region there is no professional
poultry farming. We informed them that today's healthy chick-
ens may become ill tomorrow, and it threatens all the family,
especially children. Of course, as a result of these informative
operations people now denounce themselves".
The people's response to the operations of health and
agriculture organizations and their participation is also
related to their trust in governmental authorities. It is
known that the municipality and local health care provid-
ers committed important functions in communicating
with the public and in overcoming the obstacle of distrust:
"We hardly convinced him; we couldn't convince him about
serosurvey operations for a month and called the municipality
provider (...) Anyway, native people consider you a stranger but
they know this region's people. They've helped us a lot; the
municipality convinced him.
Sometimes, people consulted to the non-governmental
organizations: "A farmer called me, called the health care pro-
vider union and found the phone number and asked 'should we
slaughter our animals or not? Bury them? What should we do?
We don't have any confidence left in authority.' He is confused.
This made me think a lot, however I was very happy that a cit-
izen trusts a non-governmental organization and is asking
something."BMC Public Health 2007, 7:330 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/330
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Lessons from the avian influenza outbreak and suggestions 
by health care providers
The health care providers we have interviewed mentioned
that human cases presented direct contact histories with
domestic birds, which is part of the lifestyle here. Direct
contact with diseased animals or waste from slaughtering
is basic reason of contamination, especially for children.
A director working in the Van PHD drew the sheltering
status for the avian influenza patients: "There was a close
contact history for all those kids. The K. Brothers' home has
only one room. At night, because it's winter time, they bring in
the chickens in cardboard boxes, and look after them in there,
sleeping together. A high contact risk is present."
An infectious disease specialist defined the risk of contam-
ination: "Exposure to viral loads, the amount of infectious
agent, is lower in older people because children deal with chick-
ens, one-to- one. In most of the H5N1 positive cases, the
chicken gets ill and when they understand that it is going to die,
they decide to cook and eat it. Who's going to clean it and cook
it? The youngest daughter, of course. Big brother slaughters it
and leaves it like that. Younger sister cleans the animal."
During visits to the house of the avian influenza patient,
the general practitioner from the primary health care
center evaluated the habitat such as the following were: "I
observed this at the front of S.'s house. Why have all members
of the family caught influenza? There is a small river, a bad
one, which passes behind their house. There is nothing like a
sewerage system or toilet, it is directly connected to the river.
There is no clean water in the house. That day S. had hugged
the chicken but her uncle's daughter had picked it. She couldn't
have washed her hands properly. There is a very serious hygiene
and infrastructure problem."
Health status, sheltering, infrastructure problems of com-
munity were related with H5N1 transmission in Dog-
ubeyazit and Van, as explained by a general practitioner:
"I've observed here, the reason of the deaths is not the avian
influenza virus; it is poverty, chronic diseases, and negligence
of children. Most dead were children, and some didn't even
have ID's (...) Chickens were slaughtered on open ground.
Those dead children played with the chickens, they played with
their heads as puppets, and they slept together in the evening."
According to the health care providers' experiences, to
deal with an outbreak, the health system must be
strengthened, health services should be coordinated, sur-
veillance system and the notification for communicable
diseases must be operated efficiently, human and animal
health care should be integrated.
Health personnel suggested that the preparedness of the
health organizations is very important for an outbreak in
terms of equipment, human resources and information
gathering The preparation studies should not only be on
the management level, but also throughout the health
organization and the experience of public health workers
must be taken into account:
"In such a disaster you should be ready with your team. Even if
the human resource are not enough, teams would be ready,
patient data forms should be available immediately, surveil-
lance and a health team, and, of course, communication with
the ministry, to make sure that the supplies are brought to the
place."
"Field studies are very important. The opinions of public health
workers are much more valuable than what the health director
said (...). I mean, PHDs should take care of public health
workers envision."
"The 1961 Act on the Socialization of Health Services states
that a midwife can take care of a population of up to 2000–
2500 people. At Van, there is still one nurse or midwife caring
for 7000 people. This is the case for the primary health care
services currently. (...) Our health record and notification sys-
tem is not fully installed yet".
"A little bit of knowledge and understanding of rural areas and
rural life is needed. People who came from urban areas are not
aware of the picture. Who will work where, how the organiza-
tion will be established and to command of the health personnel
are very important."
Some of the suggestions of the health care providers about
surveillance were:
"If you follow up an outpatient, you have to visit them every
day. It cannot be done by the state or the university hospital.
This must be reported to primary health care centers.
"My opinion is that continuing education of health care provid-
ers should be provided, so the practitioner who notices a sus-
pected case can take the details of the patient's history. If it is
done like this, the system will work better, a recording system is
formed".
According to the experiences of health personnel, sectors
and institutions related to the outbreak control must work
in collaboration and be coordinated: "(...) avian influenza
control absolutely a multi-sector activity. No one should try to
be a hero. Every health organization continues with its task; if
the organizations of agriculture, municipality, gendarme,
police, mufti, education are not included, your success will be
overshadowed, and your aim is not achieved."
The subjects that most stressed by the health personnel
were the prevention of transmission from animal to ani-
mal and from animal to human. The health personnelBMC Public Health 2007, 7:330 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/330
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agreed that besides culling animals, studies on preserving
animal health must be developed and sustained. In place
of traditional poultry farming, alternatives suggested
included changes to modern poultry farming at nearby
settlements:
"At this time our advice to the Van PAD was that since all of
them were culling, new projects must be developed and infor-
mation should be gathered on poultry farming. Of course, this
should be done with government support."
"The origin oriented control should be. Firstly, a surveillance
system at our borders must work well, especially in terms of ani-
mal surveillance, but also mainly before disaster happens, not
only when a pandemic or epidemic occurs (...)."
As the health personnel, communication and information
gathering is very important for the outbreak control. The
public's psychology and needs must be taken into account
to enable them to cooperate with the health teams. The
general practitioner who has a close relationship with the
local people emphasized the importance of people's psy-
chology and environmental factors. "I mean, why wasn't 'a
child playing with chicken heads like puppets' put on the
agenda? When she was discharged from the hospital, she came
to visit me and I bought her a doll and advised her not to play
with chickens, which are microbial things. She slept with the
doll for many nights. Why didn't anyone underline this occa-
sion? Why was the people's psychological status not taken into
account? Why wasn't attention paid to the problems related to
the housing infrastructure or the lack of clean water? I still
can't accept this; it still affects me."
Discussion
The Turkish Avian Influenza outbreak is an example for
other countries in respect of the experiences and lessons
achieved by the health organization managers and health
care providers who actively worked in the process.
The health care providers who participated in our study
think that the avian outbreak reached national and
regional crisis level because they faced an unknown
emerging infectious disease and the threat to health that it
was not predicted.
According to the health care providers, the most critical
issue was the coordination between the agriculture and
health organizations during crisis control. The main rea-
son for this problem was the lack of organizational prep-
aration compatible with central or regional plans. To be
prepared for an outbreak, it is vital to define the central,
regional and local organizational framework, to maintain
close cooperation and collaboration between the health
and agriculture sectors and to share information on sur-
veillance, evaluating the risk to humans and planning
interventions at the time when a case occurs [9-12]. WHO
indicated that Turkey's preparedness plan provided a
framework for action, even if not yet fully developed [3].
Indeed the Turkish MoH published the country's first
national pandemic influenza action plan in October 2005
and a circular was sent to health organizations about pos-
sible avian influenza case descriptions and precautions
[3,8]. On the other hand, the results of this study indicates
that, the circulation of the avian influenza action plan was
insufficient, and regional and national activities related
the outbreak control only started after following the veri-
fication of H5N1 virus in poultry. As preventive human
and animal health care, organizational preparations were
incomplete. WHO states that there was no active surveil-
lance in neighbouring provinces after a domestic animal
outbreak was confirmed in Igdir in December 2005 [3].
According to the health care providers who participated in
our study, a reference laboratory could not meet the
demand for the animal samples and after the human cases
arose, the Turkish MoA decided to cull all the poultry
without searching for possible or confirmed cases.
Because there were not enough agriculture personnel for
the culling at Van, the Turkish MoA purchased support
from private veterinary clinics. This shows us the size of
crisis and the lack of preparedness such as reviewing
organizational facilities and operational plans in pre-out-
break phase. As a result, the work of outer-organizational
teams, which proceeded in their own region, was not inte-
grated with that of other regional health teams that con-
tinued surveillance. The evaluation of animal health
services at that period is limited in this study because we
did not interview agriculture personnel. Future research
should focus on the experiences of the animal health serv-
ice personnel.
Evidently, chaos is unavoidable in primary health care
services that do not include central and organizational
level intervention plans for emerging avian influenza-like
infectious diseases, as in the Turkey example. The health
care providers think that the strengths and weaknesses of
the health organizational structure before the outbreak
affected the success of the intervention and problems were
encountered in coordination between health institutions.
While a failure is expected even in the health services of
developed countries following a possible avian influenza
pandemic [13,14], the chaos can be bigger in developing
countries due to the weaknesses of health organization.
Therefore, strengthening the healthsystem in developing
countries shouldbe considered as a factor in delaying the
worldwide spread of avian influenza. National and inter-
national network and partnerships have to maintain cur-
rent public health and animal health infrastructures and
resources for construction, modernization, enhancementBMC Public Health 2007, 7:330 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/330
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and recruitment for unprecedented emerging and re-
emerging disease [15].
The most critical issue related to the health system is the
surveillance system. The notification of communicable
diseases in Turkey was changed in recent years. In the new
system, influenza group diseases are subject to sentinel
surveillance. According to the sentinel surveillance, pri-
mary health care centers have no obligation to notify
influenza group diseases including the possible avian
influenza cases. Only the training and research hospitals
in some selected provinces have the duty for notification
of confirmed influenza cases. During the Turkish avian
influenza outbreak, Van and Dogubeyazit (Agri) were not
included among the selected provinces.
The health care providers who participated in our study
emphasized that the widespread of the outbreak requires
follow-up and assessment of all influenza cases who
applied to health care centers. As the interviewees stated,
trace-back investigations were not performed because of
the current surveillance system mentioned above. The
need for an active surveillance system is clear for an epi-
demic disease such as avian influenza, which is seasonal,
regional and closely related to epidemic diseases related
to agricultural practice. In the WHO Report dealing with
lessons from the avian influenza outbreak in Turkey, the
need for active surveillance of animal and human avian
influenza outbreaks was underlined [3]. A well integrated
effort such as lining up a network between animal and
public health laboratory system is needed to define an
epidemic earlier, ensure more effective control measures
[7,15]. This will possibly make us gain valuable time by
delaying a pandemic.
Practitioners, midwives and nurses, who are responsible
for population-based health care services in the primary
health care system, became the most important human
resource for surveillance during the avian influenza out-
break in Turkey. This experience clearly shows that pri-
mary health care centers should be included in the
surveillance system. For a efficient surveillance system,
upgrading the sentinel physician network by enlisting and
retraining more participants and [16] the coordination
among public health workers, clinicians and managers is
most necessary. It is accepted that public health workers
will play an integral role in an influenza pandemic [17].
The health managers and providers whom we interviewed
believe that their experiences must be reflected in national
avian influenza preparedness plans.
Another problem encountered during the avian influenza
outbreak in Turkey was the fear of contamination risk
among the health care providers who have no protective
equipment against H5N1 when the outbreak started. It is
as important to train the health personnel to be prepared
for an outbreak as it is to stock protective equipment for
them at the sites of preparation studies [14,15,18]. Inter-
viewees believe that the delay in supplying protective
equipment and the lack of orderly planning in the distri-
bution of it caused concerns among health care providers
about contamination risk, which affected their work out-
put. Health personnel must be accepted as the primary
group in prevention, and mortality and morbidity among
them must be minimized to allow for efficient interven-
tion by the maximum number of personnel during an
avian influenza pandemic. Even if epidemiological evi-
dence about the spread of the H5N1 virus from patients to
health personnel is limited [19], studies indicate that
nurses who work in hospitals and public health workers
touching the suspected avian influenza cases may experi-
ence fear and anxiety for their own and their families'
health and can face ethical dilemmas when deciding
between continuing their work and maintaining their
families' health [20,21].
Several problems were experienced during intervention in
the outbreak by health care providers who participated in
the study. They may be classified as problems related to
the socio-economic conditions of people living in the
region, and those related to the health care system, includ-
ing the management and surveillance systems:
The health care providers emphasized that people who
lived in the rural part of Dogubeyazit and the suburban
areas of Van that gather migrants lacked basic needs such
as health, education and infrastructure. According to the
interviewees, the outbreak in Turkey was influenced by
factors closely related to traditional poultry farming and
poverty-line economics, as was the case in Asian countries
[22]. According to the health personnel who participated
in our study, the infection spread rapidly because domes-
tic birds belonging to neighbourhood backyards were able
to walk around freely. It is possible that wild migrant birds
may be in contact with poultry in the area for food or
water. Family-based small-scale poultry farming is a major
source of income and nutrition for the region.
All our interviewees thought that the most important fac-
tor in the transmission of the H5N1 virus from animal to
human was the sharing of shelter according to the low
socioeconomic status of the family. Especially during fall
and winter, family members share their one sleeping and
dining room with poultry. From the year 2004, the con-
tact histories of children and young adults who are
described as a risk group for avian influenza cases
throughout the world resemble the ones in Turkey [23].
Health care providers who worked in Van and Dog-
ubeyazit stated that people had eaten ill chickens before
death and young adults had taken part in the cleaning,BMC Public Health 2007, 7:330 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/7/330
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cooking and slaughtering of the chickens. Children had
played with sick animals and corpses.
The low socio-economic status of the people was accom-
panied by insufficient primary health care services in the
region. The first avian influenza cases were diagnosed
after lower respiratory tract infection symptoms appeared.
All the fatalities were among those who had recently
applied to a health center and been diagnosed as avian
influenza. Informants have differing explanations for the
late diagnosis of the patients. According to some, the first
admission of the families was late. Others claim that the
family of the first cases was sent back home during the
first admission, and avian flu was diagnosed only after
their second admission.
The community was affected psychologically and eco-
nomically from the disaster. Avian influenza created the
fear of a mysterious disease on the people. Most of the
people were subject to a financial loss because of the
slaughtering of their poultries and were impoverished rel-
ative to previous status. In this study we found that the
communication between community and health person-
nel is important for establishing public support for out-
break control and to overcome obstacles such as lack of
confidence in governmental organizations. After the avian
cases were verified in Turkey, the declaration by the Turk-
ish MoH was evaluated affirmative by the health care pro-
viders. It is very important that managers be clear about
the known and unknown issues by the first stage of the
avian influenza crisis, inform the people about health
risks and precautions as early as possible, and be sensitive
the worries of people [24,25].
According to the health personnel interviewed, the reason
why poultry were kept as a supply of food and living in
Van and Dogubeyazit at the time the culling started was
the lack of public education about preventable health
problems in the region, as much as economic security. The
experiences of health personnel indicate that the people
participated more after the crisis centers were established
by the health and agriculture boards, phone counselling
services were made available, good communication was
established between health personnel and the people dur-
ing surveillance, and information studies were applied by
media channels.
Conclusion
Turkey experience in avian influenza outbreak shows that
preparation planning and surveillance systems should be
rational and sustainable. The lack of organizational emer-
gency disease plans delineating the tasks and responsibil-
ities of health care providers in the event of a possible
avian influenza outbreak, and the lack of training about
preventive care, caused health personnel to be caught
unprepared by the outbreak. The problems in supplying
and distributing protective equipment, reflecting another
dimension of the lack of organizational preparedness,
influenced the efficiency of the health care providers'
work because they were anxious about their own and their
families' health. During the preparation and updating of
national epidemic and pandemic plans, and during out-
break management, public health workers should partici-
pate effectively in decision-making and risk
communication. A well designed communication strategy
people's participation in control and may relieve from the
psychological effects of the outbreak.
Animal and human health care services could not be well
coordinated owing to the lack of integrated preparation
and planning. Because the sentinel surveillance of influ-
enza infections in Turkey was based on the confirmation
of the cases diagnosed at the training and research hospi-
tals in selected provinces, detection of possible human
avian influenza cases at the primary health care level was
hindered and trace-back investigation was precluded. To
evaluate the spread of the avian influenza outbreak accu-
rately, evaluation and follow-up of influenza cases needs
to be done in all health care centers. Such evaluation also
necessitates integrated human and animal surveillance
and control measures.
The causes of transmission of the H5N1 virus from wild to
domestic animals in Turkey are closely related to socioe-
conomic conditions and traditional poultry farming. Pov-
erty in the region played a predisposing role in the
outbreak and the outbreak also increased poverty. Limited
access to education, shelter, water supply and waste
removal formed the basis for virus transmission from ani-
mals to animals and animals to humans. To reduce the
risks rising from these predisposing conditions, infrastruc-
ture needs to be built specially at the village level.
Although the limited access to health care services and the
high contact rate with ill chickens were among the charac-
teristics of the vulnerable group, the rapid organization of
the health authorities during intervention studies pre-
vented an increase in the mortality rate. Despite the
above-mentioned problems in preparedness about coor-
dination during the avian influenza outbreak control, the
rapid response and performance of the health workers
played an important role in controlling epidemic.
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